I read your piece with interest, and I think it's important to question assumptions about how propaganda works—especially when the word is used so broadly today. That said, I think there’s a misreading of the Radio and the Rise of the Nazis study in your argument.
That paper doesn’t make claims about the impact of propaganda in the present day; it’s a historical study focused on Germany in the 1920s and 30s. Your concern seems to be that people often overstate the predictive power of historical trends—fair enough—but this study doesn’t attempt to make predictive claims. It analyzes variation in exposure and outcomes in a specific political and media environment, not ours.
Even if the study had shown that Nazi radio had overwhelming influence, our media consumption context is entirely different now. Trying to test propaganda effects on me using 1930s-style radio would be like testing modern climate skepticism using smoke signals. The medium matters. So I’m not sure we can compare Nazi Germany to Rwanda simply because both had radio—as if that makes the channel functionally equivalent.
Your own list of “what propaganda does” is compelling, but it also overlaps heavily with what we call modern public relations. A campaign to justify building a VIP golf resort on forest land could meet several of those criteria—mobilisation, distraction, narrative control—without necessarily being classified as propaganda.
One thing I would push back on is the idea that propaganda “doesn’t need to be false.” I’d argue that falsity is actually central to what makes propaganda propaganda—not necessarily outright lies, but structural distortion: selective framing, emotional manipulation, concealment of counter-evidence. That’s what distinguishes it from agitation, which mobilizes people through confrontation with uncomfortable or suppressed truths.
If we blur that line too much, we risk calling any persuasive communication "propaganda"—which ironically lets actual propaganda off the hook by normalizing it.
Agitation is not propaganda. Lenin knew that. And it’s worth remembering that Agitprop predates Hitler’s rise to power—so I'm not sure one dictatorship holds the gold medal in propaganda. The techniques may differ, but the historical lineage matters if we want to understand what these tools were designed to do—and when they cross the line from informing to manipulating. When we’re talking about persuasive framing, it is always interpreted through the lens of the recipient.
That’s where I struggle with the takeaway. If persuasiveness is context-dependent, and the study shows mobilization more than persuasion, then what are we really concluding? That media can rally people who are already inclined to act? That’s important, yes—but it’s not the same as proving propaganda shapes beliefs from scratch.
So I appreciate the nuance you're after, but I’m not sure the examples you cite quite serve the critique you’re making.
Nazi propaganda was mostly visually so effective that nazis appear in movies (and games) 80 years later and no end in sight for that movie career. This career also raises interest to nazi ideology, not totally neglible I think
Young Wittgenstein's Theory continues to hold: almost all philosophical problems are language problems. But it's far too simple of an explanation for the hubristic Western culture of 2024, so blinded by The Science they can't see what's right in front of their eyes.
Seems like a gross overstatement to me - the article doesn't measure "persuasion" in an interesting sense - but I'd be interested what you think given you have much greater expertise.
I read your piece with interest, and I think it's important to question assumptions about how propaganda works—especially when the word is used so broadly today. That said, I think there’s a misreading of the Radio and the Rise of the Nazis study in your argument.
That paper doesn’t make claims about the impact of propaganda in the present day; it’s a historical study focused on Germany in the 1920s and 30s. Your concern seems to be that people often overstate the predictive power of historical trends—fair enough—but this study doesn’t attempt to make predictive claims. It analyzes variation in exposure and outcomes in a specific political and media environment, not ours.
Even if the study had shown that Nazi radio had overwhelming influence, our media consumption context is entirely different now. Trying to test propaganda effects on me using 1930s-style radio would be like testing modern climate skepticism using smoke signals. The medium matters. So I’m not sure we can compare Nazi Germany to Rwanda simply because both had radio—as if that makes the channel functionally equivalent.
Your own list of “what propaganda does” is compelling, but it also overlaps heavily with what we call modern public relations. A campaign to justify building a VIP golf resort on forest land could meet several of those criteria—mobilisation, distraction, narrative control—without necessarily being classified as propaganda.
One thing I would push back on is the idea that propaganda “doesn’t need to be false.” I’d argue that falsity is actually central to what makes propaganda propaganda—not necessarily outright lies, but structural distortion: selective framing, emotional manipulation, concealment of counter-evidence. That’s what distinguishes it from agitation, which mobilizes people through confrontation with uncomfortable or suppressed truths.
If we blur that line too much, we risk calling any persuasive communication "propaganda"—which ironically lets actual propaganda off the hook by normalizing it.
Agitation is not propaganda. Lenin knew that. And it’s worth remembering that Agitprop predates Hitler’s rise to power—so I'm not sure one dictatorship holds the gold medal in propaganda. The techniques may differ, but the historical lineage matters if we want to understand what these tools were designed to do—and when they cross the line from informing to manipulating. When we’re talking about persuasive framing, it is always interpreted through the lens of the recipient.
That’s where I struggle with the takeaway. If persuasiveness is context-dependent, and the study shows mobilization more than persuasion, then what are we really concluding? That media can rally people who are already inclined to act? That’s important, yes—but it’s not the same as proving propaganda shapes beliefs from scratch.
So I appreciate the nuance you're after, but I’m not sure the examples you cite quite serve the critique you’re making.
Nazi propaganda was mostly visually so effective that nazis appear in movies (and games) 80 years later and no end in sight for that movie career. This career also raises interest to nazi ideology, not totally neglible I think
This explains the root of the problem:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FaJaCgqBKphrDzDSj/37-ways-that-words-can-be-wrong
Young Wittgenstein's Theory continues to hold: almost all philosophical problems are language problems. But it's far too simple of an explanation for the hubristic Western culture of 2024, so blinded by The Science they can't see what's right in front of their eyes.
Great work as always Tom. Have you looked at this paper: https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/3/2/pgae035/7591134?login=false
In an article in The Conversation they write: "A recent paper illustrated how large language models can be deployed to craft micro-targeted ads at scale, estimating that for every 100,000 individuals targeted, at least several thousand can be persuaded." Link: https://theconversation.com/disinformation-threatens-global-elections-heres-how-to-fight-back-223392
Seems like a gross overstatement to me - the article doesn't measure "persuasion" in an interesting sense - but I'd be interested what you think given you have much greater expertise.
Thanks Dan. I don' t know that paper - I'll have a look and see what I think (no promises on speed!)
i have a two part response this paper. Here's the first part https://tomstafford.substack.com/p/ai-juiced-political-microtargeting