Reasonable People #29 how we measure conspiracy theory beliefs, and the vulnerabilities to confusion thereby introduced. Look away now if you don't want to see how the sausage is made.
I find the whole concept of conspiracy theories baffling. There’s the stuff that is quite clear (flat earth...) but what about climate skepticism? Some « mainstream » theories (the wilder claims of some gender theorists spring to mind) surely qualify as being totally anti-science yet no one calls them conspiracy theories. One thing that I find interesting is that people who oppose a mainstream theory often oppose more than one. Not sure what it means.
Many thanks for an interesting post on conspiracy theories. While it is interesting to have a digest of some work on this subject I have some observations.
First is the rather thorny question of what is a conspiracy theory. I would expect a definition that would differentiate a conspiracy theory from other aspects of shared belief, beliefs that are not a conspiracy theories. I strongly suspect that such a definition would be exceedingly difficult or impossible and that suggests that the attention should be turned elsewhere. Using the example in the blog there are some that belief that vaccines are not beneficial but rather form a risk whereas there are others that believe that they beneficial and worthwhile; which is the conspiracy theory.
My second observation is that most, though not all, of the questionnaire items refer to groups; secret organisations, government, the public, etc. To me this points more to group behaviour rather than conspiracy theories as such. I had hoped to see an exploration of group formation, utility and behaviour as a way of exploring conspiracy theories. I feel that the academic psychology is bedevilled by efforts to come up with something new rather that like to and evidence the best - most enduring - theories of human behaviour.
While I have not read the papers referenced and therefore have not read the theoretical basis for the questionnaire construction it does appear to me that the attempt to create 'conspiratorialism' as a separate psychological concept diverts attention of linking such behaviour to existing theories, group behaviour, cognitive dissonance, self-determination to name a few, which may provide more greater illumination that simply creating yet another scale.
My final musing on this piece is the motivation for conducting research (surveys wrapped in a scientific wrapper) in the first place. Is it, I wonder, simply to meet the publish imperative or is it to find a way to prevent or counter such theories? The latter carries with it the assumption that the psychologist knows better what people should believe and the whiff of manipulation of coercion to bring such people into line with proper beliefs? Just because that my belief is right and I have the science to prove it does not mean that those who do not believe it are wrong. I reflect on the basis of modern science - that all findings are provisional and tentative until disproved.
This is a tangential thought. As a methodological manoeuvre “Spectrumising” is very popular in psychology. However I think it is incumbent on the researcher to declare what kind of spectrum or continuum they have in mind. For example, you can categorize continua using a 2x2 taxonomy based on the two characteristics (1) whether the poles are open-ended or closed, and (2) whether the poles represent opposites or more vs. less of the same attribute.
Thank you for this interesting canter through the ‘science’ in this field. What I always notice is that the label ‘conspiracy’ has strong moral valence which gets in the way of dispassionately considering certain ideas somewhat.
A QAnon follower will think you don’t care about children if you question the global elite paedophile ring. An admirer of Ukraine’s resistance to invasion will think you support Russia if you entertain the possibility that the Bucha executions may have at least been partly conducted by Ukrainian authorities against collaborators.
Conspiracy is a word like communist or fascist in that it ends up used for unhelpfully broad ends, which often include stopping people from openly engaging on many issues. It can only be used that way because it’s a nebulous concept and the efforts you describe seem insufficient to surmount that.
I find the whole concept of conspiracy theories baffling. There’s the stuff that is quite clear (flat earth...) but what about climate skepticism? Some « mainstream » theories (the wilder claims of some gender theorists spring to mind) surely qualify as being totally anti-science yet no one calls them conspiracy theories. One thing that I find interesting is that people who oppose a mainstream theory often oppose more than one. Not sure what it means.
Many thanks for an interesting post on conspiracy theories. While it is interesting to have a digest of some work on this subject I have some observations.
First is the rather thorny question of what is a conspiracy theory. I would expect a definition that would differentiate a conspiracy theory from other aspects of shared belief, beliefs that are not a conspiracy theories. I strongly suspect that such a definition would be exceedingly difficult or impossible and that suggests that the attention should be turned elsewhere. Using the example in the blog there are some that belief that vaccines are not beneficial but rather form a risk whereas there are others that believe that they beneficial and worthwhile; which is the conspiracy theory.
My second observation is that most, though not all, of the questionnaire items refer to groups; secret organisations, government, the public, etc. To me this points more to group behaviour rather than conspiracy theories as such. I had hoped to see an exploration of group formation, utility and behaviour as a way of exploring conspiracy theories. I feel that the academic psychology is bedevilled by efforts to come up with something new rather that like to and evidence the best - most enduring - theories of human behaviour.
While I have not read the papers referenced and therefore have not read the theoretical basis for the questionnaire construction it does appear to me that the attempt to create 'conspiratorialism' as a separate psychological concept diverts attention of linking such behaviour to existing theories, group behaviour, cognitive dissonance, self-determination to name a few, which may provide more greater illumination that simply creating yet another scale.
My final musing on this piece is the motivation for conducting research (surveys wrapped in a scientific wrapper) in the first place. Is it, I wonder, simply to meet the publish imperative or is it to find a way to prevent or counter such theories? The latter carries with it the assumption that the psychologist knows better what people should believe and the whiff of manipulation of coercion to bring such people into line with proper beliefs? Just because that my belief is right and I have the science to prove it does not mean that those who do not believe it are wrong. I reflect on the basis of modern science - that all findings are provisional and tentative until disproved.
This is a tangential thought. As a methodological manoeuvre “Spectrumising” is very popular in psychology. However I think it is incumbent on the researcher to declare what kind of spectrum or continuum they have in mind. For example, you can categorize continua using a 2x2 taxonomy based on the two characteristics (1) whether the poles are open-ended or closed, and (2) whether the poles represent opposites or more vs. less of the same attribute.
Thank you for this interesting canter through the ‘science’ in this field. What I always notice is that the label ‘conspiracy’ has strong moral valence which gets in the way of dispassionately considering certain ideas somewhat.
A QAnon follower will think you don’t care about children if you question the global elite paedophile ring. An admirer of Ukraine’s resistance to invasion will think you support Russia if you entertain the possibility that the Bucha executions may have at least been partly conducted by Ukrainian authorities against collaborators.
Conspiracy is a word like communist or fascist in that it ends up used for unhelpfully broad ends, which often include stopping people from openly engaging on many issues. It can only be used that way because it’s a nebulous concept and the efforts you describe seem insufficient to surmount that.